Iran's Presidential Election Crisis
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Accusations and rumors of election irregularities and fraud have led to a review of the presidential election results in Iran. Late Sunday (June 14th), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, ordered the Council of Guardians to investigate Friday's elections.
Accusations include: missing election ballots; outright intimidation by Basij and military units; "overwhelming" Ahmadinejad victories in the hometowns of his three competitors, and a refusal of the Interior Ministry to detail the breakdown of voting by province (something that has been done in previous elections).
Khamenei's order is a major turn of events, as this reverses his pronouncement from Saturday blessing Ahmadinejad's victory (with 65% of the vote) as "a divine judgment." This election was crucial in the fact that the main challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi stood a very good chance of succeeding Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. If that had been the case, it would have been the first time that an incumbent would have lost a presidential election. Mousavi's election (had it been successful) would have also returned a more moderate faction to power.
Herein lies the dilemma facing Iran and Iran's leadership: Has the time truly come to allow a newer, more pragmatic faction to power? Has the time come to allow the younger generations to begin acceding to positions of responsibility?
Mousavi favors some type of undefined engagement with the west as opposed to full confrontation (as favored by Ahmadinejad and other hard-line conservatives). This is no mere point; Mousavi like Khamenei was an active participant in Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. He (Mousavi) is one of the founding fathers of the Islamic Republic, and also a twice former Prime Minister.
His participation in the election was not trivial; if anything, this was a serious challenge to existing status quo and a challenge to what many Iranians perceive as an outdated, aging and dysfunctional political establishment.
The secondary question (to who rightfully won the election) is who is Iran? Ahmadinejad's victory, as it stands today, is based on an electorate that comprises the urban poor and the conservative rural districts. If Ahmadinejad truly won the majority of votes, then these populations indeed turned out in larger numbers than expected. This would also indicate that a majority of the people not only favor Ahmadinejad himself and his policies, but also a reluctance to change the nature and course of the Islamic Revolution. This is the "first" Iran, the population who supported, lived through and largely took part in the Islamic Revolution.
The ruling elite of the "first" Iran have gripes against the outside world (many, but not all legitimate). They also have a vision for Iran and the Iranian nation. This includes not only Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, but the Council of Guardians, arch-conservative clerics, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and nationalists.
The "second" Iran can be seen as the opposition. These are seen as the younger people, the urban rich and middle class and less religious (maybe even secularized) citizens. Demographics estimate that some 50 to 70% of Iranians are under age 30. Included in this grouping are (those over 50) many who took part in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as they were just as opposed to the Shah's rule as their more conservative colleagues.
Those in this grouping over age 30 are seeking an Iran that is not feared, yet respected. Those in this group are more pragmatic, but no less nationalist guardians of their nation than their conservative colleagues. The difference is that these individuals are open to discussion and willing to change policy if it aids the nation and the state. As an example, Mir Hossein Mousavi is 68 years old, yet his political acumen seemed more reserved than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who is 53).
The younger people are portrayed as either seeking a more open political or socially "softer" Iran. They are seeking true economic and professional opportunities. This generation needs to grow and contribute to their nation; however, Iran's continuing economic morass prevents this. Through Ahmadinejad's mishandling of the economy, Iran is not losing time, but losing a generation of educated and talented people.
The middle class have their own concerns, largely that the stagnating economy is hurting them both materially and financially. The middle class would prefer more political openness, and the opportunity to conduct business with less control and oversight.
What cannot and must not be overlooked, ignored or forgotten is the theology which is the base of the Iranian Revolution, the Shi'a branch of Islam. The rulers of Iran are the clerics, full believers and leaders of the community (Ummah). Their role as leaders, is more than just political and religious; in many ways, their role is as fathers; true guardians. It is their duty (both collective and individual) to make sure the nation and state remains true to Allah and unblemished by the outside.
In this rubric, change, if it must happen must be done at the right time and entrusted to those who will truly guard the nation and state. Iran's leadership is aging and knows that sometime soon it must pass on what was achieved to the new generation. What will be passed is not just policy, but a legacy - and that legacy is from Allah.
It is worthy to note that the protests and slogans being shouted are very, very reminiscent of the years 1977 - 1979. One of the most frightening things that must be crossing Khamenei's mind is that there be no repetition of 1979. That type of change would be not only catastrophic, but seen as apostasy. That type of apostasy would not just be seen as a sin by the conservatives, but also as a failing on their part and to Allah to protect and properly guard the Revolution and the nation.
This sadly, is something that the non-Islamic and secularized world does not understand.
Change will not come easily. The review of the election results will probably not change the outcome, however, this signals that the leadership is willing to work to prevent social and political upheaval.
Iran has lived through one revolution in the last 30 years. It is a revolution that is still ongoing, only this time it is being fed by those who grew up and came of age during the revolution. The younger generation has no memory of the Shah's regime, and the nearly overnight transition of Iran into its modern era. They could, very well soon be the catalyst for yet another revolution in Iran. What direction that takes is yet to be seen, but should it happen, the world would have to deal with a "younger" led nation that holds one of the keys to the world.
That new leadership will not only have the responsibility to the Islamic Revolution which gave birth to the nation they will inherit, but also to prove themselves to their own people. They will have to ensure that the economic, political and geopolitical concerns of Iran are met and protected.
Please see our disclosures at the Wall Street Greek website and author bio pages found there.
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Iran's Presidential Election Crisis
A Return to the Past?Accusations and rumors of election irregularities and fraud have led to a review of the presidential election results in Iran. Late Sunday (June 14th), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, ordered the Council of Guardians to investigate Friday's elections.
Accusations include: missing election ballots; outright intimidation by Basij and military units; "overwhelming" Ahmadinejad victories in the hometowns of his three competitors, and a refusal of the Interior Ministry to detail the breakdown of voting by province (something that has been done in previous elections).
Khamenei's order is a major turn of events, as this reverses his pronouncement from Saturday blessing Ahmadinejad's victory (with 65% of the vote) as "a divine judgment." This election was crucial in the fact that the main challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi stood a very good chance of succeeding Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. If that had been the case, it would have been the first time that an incumbent would have lost a presidential election. Mousavi's election (had it been successful) would have also returned a more moderate faction to power.
Herein lies the dilemma facing Iran and Iran's leadership: Has the time truly come to allow a newer, more pragmatic faction to power? Has the time come to allow the younger generations to begin acceding to positions of responsibility?
Mousavi favors some type of undefined engagement with the west as opposed to full confrontation (as favored by Ahmadinejad and other hard-line conservatives). This is no mere point; Mousavi like Khamenei was an active participant in Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. He (Mousavi) is one of the founding fathers of the Islamic Republic, and also a twice former Prime Minister.
His participation in the election was not trivial; if anything, this was a serious challenge to existing status quo and a challenge to what many Iranians perceive as an outdated, aging and dysfunctional political establishment.
The secondary question (to who rightfully won the election) is who is Iran? Ahmadinejad's victory, as it stands today, is based on an electorate that comprises the urban poor and the conservative rural districts. If Ahmadinejad truly won the majority of votes, then these populations indeed turned out in larger numbers than expected. This would also indicate that a majority of the people not only favor Ahmadinejad himself and his policies, but also a reluctance to change the nature and course of the Islamic Revolution. This is the "first" Iran, the population who supported, lived through and largely took part in the Islamic Revolution.
The ruling elite of the "first" Iran have gripes against the outside world (many, but not all legitimate). They also have a vision for Iran and the Iranian nation. This includes not only Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, but the Council of Guardians, arch-conservative clerics, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and nationalists.
The "second" Iran can be seen as the opposition. These are seen as the younger people, the urban rich and middle class and less religious (maybe even secularized) citizens. Demographics estimate that some 50 to 70% of Iranians are under age 30. Included in this grouping are (those over 50) many who took part in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as they were just as opposed to the Shah's rule as their more conservative colleagues.
Those in this grouping over age 30 are seeking an Iran that is not feared, yet respected. Those in this group are more pragmatic, but no less nationalist guardians of their nation than their conservative colleagues. The difference is that these individuals are open to discussion and willing to change policy if it aids the nation and the state. As an example, Mir Hossein Mousavi is 68 years old, yet his political acumen seemed more reserved than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who is 53).
The younger people are portrayed as either seeking a more open political or socially "softer" Iran. They are seeking true economic and professional opportunities. This generation needs to grow and contribute to their nation; however, Iran's continuing economic morass prevents this. Through Ahmadinejad's mishandling of the economy, Iran is not losing time, but losing a generation of educated and talented people.
The middle class have their own concerns, largely that the stagnating economy is hurting them both materially and financially. The middle class would prefer more political openness, and the opportunity to conduct business with less control and oversight.
What cannot and must not be overlooked, ignored or forgotten is the theology which is the base of the Iranian Revolution, the Shi'a branch of Islam. The rulers of Iran are the clerics, full believers and leaders of the community (Ummah). Their role as leaders, is more than just political and religious; in many ways, their role is as fathers; true guardians. It is their duty (both collective and individual) to make sure the nation and state remains true to Allah and unblemished by the outside.
In this rubric, change, if it must happen must be done at the right time and entrusted to those who will truly guard the nation and state. Iran's leadership is aging and knows that sometime soon it must pass on what was achieved to the new generation. What will be passed is not just policy, but a legacy - and that legacy is from Allah.
It is worthy to note that the protests and slogans being shouted are very, very reminiscent of the years 1977 - 1979. One of the most frightening things that must be crossing Khamenei's mind is that there be no repetition of 1979. That type of change would be not only catastrophic, but seen as apostasy. That type of apostasy would not just be seen as a sin by the conservatives, but also as a failing on their part and to Allah to protect and properly guard the Revolution and the nation.
This sadly, is something that the non-Islamic and secularized world does not understand.
Change will not come easily. The review of the election results will probably not change the outcome, however, this signals that the leadership is willing to work to prevent social and political upheaval.
Iran has lived through one revolution in the last 30 years. It is a revolution that is still ongoing, only this time it is being fed by those who grew up and came of age during the revolution. The younger generation has no memory of the Shah's regime, and the nearly overnight transition of Iran into its modern era. They could, very well soon be the catalyst for yet another revolution in Iran. What direction that takes is yet to be seen, but should it happen, the world would have to deal with a "younger" led nation that holds one of the keys to the world.
That new leadership will not only have the responsibility to the Islamic Revolution which gave birth to the nation they will inherit, but also to prove themselves to their own people. They will have to ensure that the economic, political and geopolitical concerns of Iran are met and protected.
Please see our disclosures at the Wall Street Greek website and author bio pages found there.
Labels: Global Affairs Geopolitics, Iran
2 Comments:
Daniel,
Is it possible that the contenders split the opposition vote against Ahmadinejad, thereby granting him victory in their disorganization? Seems if that's the case, then a runoff vote would unfairly give the election to Mousavi, as those dissenters would vote for him instead of the candidates they voted for initially. If I were Ahmadinejad, which is a far reach I remind you, I would also not grant Mousavi a runoff. His failure may have been in not incorporating the followings of the other candidates into his fold by perhaps offering them positions in his office, should he have been elected. It's Ralph Nader all over again! What say you?
Good morning Greek,
Doubtful; according to the "official" count, Ahmadinejad posted 65% of the vote, Mousavi 33%Kharroubi 1.5% and Rezaei 0.5%. The last two candidates had no effect on the elections. This was a contest (of sorts) between the hard-liners and somewhat-modrates.
The fact that even a partial recount is being allowed is phenomonal. I think the ruling clerics are scared that they too will be wept away bu the same dynamic that swept the Shah and his minions out of Iran.
There now seems to be growing dissension within the Council of Guardians, probably sparked by a fear that an Ahmadinejad victory will see the moderates removed from power.
If this isn't 1977-1979 repeated, with the moderates gaining power, we may yet see a hard-line faction remain in power.We could see a purges and a real house cleaning.
What is at steak is the "soul" of the Islamic Revolution and what it means for the nation. This is a religious, not a political concept in the eyes and hearts of those vying for control of Iran.
Daniel Padovano
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