Wall Street Greek: The Battle for Gaza

By Daniel Padovano: Global Affairs

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The fighting in Gaza has dynamics that will lead to several changes in the Middle East. The seriousness and strength of the fighting is indicative of what both Hamas and Israel see as national survival.

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For Hamas, the struggle is for the organization's very survival both as a military and political organization. For Israel, the struggle has two sides: one is to secure the towns and cities of Southern Israel; and the second is to remove Hamas from power.

What happened was a major battle in an ongoing Palestinian civil war. In 2007, Hamas effectively removed the Gaza Strip from Fatah's control. Although there was some fighting then, Hamas rose to power through elections. However, Hamas's victory resulted in both an ideological and geographical split for the Palestinians.

Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" was both a defensive and offensive operation. The objectives, such as they are, were to 1) secure and protect southern Israel from rocket attack and 2) to create a climate that will make it impossible for Hamas to rule Gaza.

The achievement of these goals is yet to be seen. The relentless Israeli military action has resulted in a much reduced volume of rocket attacks, largely due to the destruction of rocket storage facilities and the deaths of Hamas fighters and their engineers.

The currently agreed to ceasefire, even if only for 10 days, would need to be predicated on some sort of observer force separating Gaza from Israel. Both Egypt and Israel have no desire to have observers on Egyptian or Israeli soil. Instead, the observers would be on the Palestinian territory within the Gaza Strip (Egypt would be fully responsible on its side of the border for the Rafah border crossing).

The international peacekeeping presence would physically deprive Hamas fighters of launch positions on the border proper. It is also very likely that some type of Hamas demobilization, including the destruction of rockets and launch platforms not previously destroyed will need to be accomplished. Also included would be the destruction of any remaining smuggling tunnels.

The second factor pointing towards a realization of the first goal is the scale of the physical damage to Gaza. The damage so far is estimated to be near, or above $2 billion. This includes wide damage to power and water supplies, the near total destruction of Palestinian government offices and some 25,000 homes destroyed. Over 250 smuggling tunnels have also been destroyed. The scale and scope of rebuilding will be epic to say the least. In addition to the physical destruction, Hamas lost several key people (both political and military); among them the man largely responsible for coordinating rocket attacks into Israel.

"Assuming that Hamas (as an institution) survives the current Battle for Gaza, it will be too broke and battered to effectively rule, let alone control Gaza."

Parts of the Gaza Strip are in ruins. The volume of destruction, economic dislocation and expense in rebuilding will be beyond Hamas's capability. Assuming that Hamas (as an institution) survives the current Battle for Gaza, it will be too broke and battered to effectively rule, let alone control Gaza. Signs of friction between Hamas units based in Gaza and those based in Syria have already surfaced. If this is true, and if Hamas's leadership is of differing opinions, then Hamas's leadership and administrative capabilities in Gaza may have already been seriously compromised. The strength and ability of its armed wing is also unknown and it may be a while before a post battle assessment can be concluded due to the devastation in the Gaza Strip.

If Hamas has been damaged enough, and becomes split, it may have no other option but to work with Fatah and whatever international organizations are able to operate in Gaza. The rebuilding effort should occupy most of the region's players for the next few years. (Saudi Arabia has already pledged $1 billion for reconstruction).

If Hamas does not survive, the ensuing power vacuum will probably become the ward of either the United Nations or Fatah (which controls the West Bank). That precludes a total breakdown and descent into total anarchy.

Removing Hamas from power (whether by outright removal or if it is weakened so badly that it has no choice but to work with Fatah) is something that would be favorable to Egypt, Israel and Fatah. Neighboring Jordan and Saudi Arabia would see this as a benefit as well.

For Fatah, the destruction or removal of Hamas could potentially result in Fatah regaining control of Gaza either on its own or through the assistance of whatever international observers are on the ground (post military action). Note that this may be a nominal handover. Hamas's 2007 victory over Fatah was due to the people's support of Hamas. It will be the residents of Gaza that will determine whether or not Fatah is able to rule in their name. Fatah and Israel will and must recognize this fact. Fatah and Israel need to keep in mind that even a weakened and split Hamas may yet remain in control of the Gaza Strip.

For Egypt and Israel, the removal (or destruction) of Hamas relieves both nations of having a fundamentalist and militant Islamic entity on their borders. Additionally, Israel would be relieved of constant missile attacks. The recent missile attacks have placed more Israeli cities and towns at risk than before. Hamas's Iranian supplied Fajr-3 rockets have increased Hamas' reach 25 miles beyond Gaza's borders, something that had not been attained by the Palestinians.

Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have their own reasons for seeing Hamas removed from power or destroyed. Largely, this is due to Iran's physical as well as ideological support for Hamas. Hama's fundamentalism, militancy and social activism are seen as destabilizing and threatening to their regimes. Many in these countries support Hamas. On its own, Hamas is an inspiration for many in the region.

Approximately 70% of Jordan's population is Palestinian and has ties to both parts of the Palestine National Authority (West Bank and Gaza Strip).

Saudi Arabia and Egypt also distrust Hamas's close ties to Iran. Saudi Arabia, in particular sees Iranian influence potentially surrounding it. To the east of Saudi Arabia is Iran proper, to the north is Iranian supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and on the northwest, Iranian supported Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Rumors have already leaked out that Iranian engineers were assisting Hamas fighters in improving and constructing rockets fired into Israel during this recent conflict, and they may still be in Gaza.

The ceasefire (of 10 days duration) may be the beginning of a shift in power dynamics in the Middle East. If the reports come to fruition, it would signal several things: 1) that Hamas went as far as possible and has come close to losing, 2) that Israel remains the dominant power broker in the region and 3) that Israel is able to prevail over an armed guerrilla force (this exorcises the result of the 2006 war in Lebanon against Hezbollah).

If the ceasefire holds, Gaza may very well find its way back into Fatah's control. Whether or not this happens will be dependent on the people of Gaza and on Israel. Regardless of Fatah's desires, it is the people of Gaza who will decide whether or not they will recognize and allow Fatah to assume control and function.

The same ceasefire would also see the placement of another international peace keeping force in the Middle East. Presumably this one would have more authority to act than its UNDOF, UNIFIL and UNTSO counterparts. Current arrangements will most likely include either a European Union and American, or a NATO force under American command. It is also possible (but in no way confirmed) that Turkey may be asked to coordinate whatever Gaza Observer Force comes into being. Turkey, was until 1917, the ruling power in what is today Israel and Palestine.