Misconception Confuses Georgia/Russia Conflict

By "The Greek"

A broad misconception born of Russian propaganda and media rush to judgment has confused the broader populous' understanding of the events in the Causasus.

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The vast majority of media have reported, as the broader public is absorbing, that Georgia precipitated the past week's events by invading Southern Ossetia, a Georgian territory. We believe this to be a gross flaw that most arguments against Georgia are based upon. While Georgia did eventually invade Ossetia, the most important point Americans and perhaps the world audience is missing, is that Russian paramilitary and Ossetian separatists reportedly crossed into Georgian territory first that evening, drawing the fire of Georgian troops. (When I say Georgian territory, I mean Georgia, not the Ossetian region in question.)

A Long Standing Mosquito

As is often the case, the broader populous wakes up to events occurring globally only after it erupts into gunfire. Unfortunately, this leads too many to base arguments on the gunfire itself, and to leave out the events that led up to that explosion. We've already given some background here on Russian barbarism in Georgia, and illegal events that have turned the vast majority of Abkhazia's population into refugees. Please see our articles, "Bush Stands for Georgia" and "Georgia Russia War Overshadows Olympics."

For years now, Russian trained, inspired and fueled separatists in Ossetia, Abkhazia and Ajaria have been a biting mosquito to the foot of Georgia's ruling party. Addressing this issue, President Saakashvili cleaned up the seaside region of Ajaria first, and vowed to do the same for the Russia-bordering regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

With half of the Ossetian ethnic region located within Russia (Northern Ossetia), this offered the Kremlin a reason and way to punish Georgia for its successful attainment of independence and new friendships with the west. Besides this, we've noted that the closer the state is to Russia proper the more difficult is the effort to break away from the Reds. Chechnya is perhaps the best example of a struggling people that have the constant threat of Russian bullying to deal with.

Georgia United

Historically, Ossetia has long been one of the many unique micro-regions of Georgia. Georgia is very proud of its cultural diversity (a historical unification of kingdoms gave birth to greater Georgia), and at the same time, Georgians hold a strong sense of national pride that unites them. Please refer to Wikipedia here for more on Georgia's history. Based on the above assertions, we are certain that without Russian guidance and assistance, Abkhazian ethnic cleansing and Ossetian and Abkhazian secession would not have been conceived or proven successful.

In the meantime, while Georgia's President Saakashvili has sought to complete his restoration of the Georgian nation, Russia has stood in his way. There's not much sense in it all either, outside of Russian interests in the resort town of Sokhumi (in Abkhazia), or perhaps something more. We know from discussions with a prominent Georgian fund manager, that Georgia is mineral rich, and we wonder if Russia's true interest in these otherwise nonsensical efforts has something to do with geology.

Trouble Brewed

This war did not start in August of 2008, but in 1995, when Russia began supporting secession of Georgian regions (or perhaps 1991, when Georgia first broke free). Over the past few months, otherwise random gremlin-like efforts against Georgia emanating from Ossetia and Abkhazia (read Russia) have been overlooked by the world. Meanwhile, Saakashvili has been warning his peers in Europe and the US of escalation, and of Russian massing of troops, and military staging that had been ongoing on its northern border.

Enough Became Enough

At one point last week, we believe enough became enough for Georgian leadership and its troops monitoring the border with Ossetia. Receiving sniper fire got tiresome, and when, in the middle of the night, Russian paramilitary and Ossetian recruits crossed the border into Georgia proper, Mr. Saakashvili stated, "At that point, I had to act." Georgian troops fired upon those territorial trespassers and I believe fell into a Russian trap. Ossetians returned fire, drawing even greater fire from Georgian military. Then, perhaps overcome by bravado often born in battle, Georgia then made a decision to take the Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, and they did occupy it for a short while.

However, as it played out, Georgia in so doing, offered Russia an open door and a reason to intervene. Russia, under the premise of "protecting its citizens" - these being Georgians who had been offered Russian passports and mafia like "protection" and passes to conduct black market trade and drive some sort of income generation in this poor corner of the world - rolled tanks and troops into Southern Ossetia (the portion lying within Georgia). The rest, as they say, is history. But this is the take on the events I believe the world's broader populace is missing.

It Makes Sense

In the hours that followed the initial events, Saakashvili came on the air explaining to the world that a Georgian invasion of Ossetia made no sense and that it was a flawed media interpretation. He stated that his nation was some 30 times smaller in population and even more minute in geographic size, not to mention military might, in comparison to its Russian aggressor. He noted his understanding of this situation, and the naivete' it would take to enter into military conflict with his clearly well-prepared Russian counterpart. But, the world mostly missed this message. We even sought to relocate the interview of Saakashvili (previously posted on our site), within which he makes these statements, and it is mysteriously no longer available.

Once more, if Georgia intended to force Ossetia into submission, it would likely have waited a few more years so that its efforts to enter the European Union and NATO were seen through to fruition. Then, it would have gained more useful western support to face potential Russian aggression. Rather, conflict at this premature hour served Russia well, and allowed it to create premise to station forces in the breakaway regions and to state openly its view that Georgian unity was now unlikely. Russia, therefore, clearly orchestrated this opera to see its interests through before it would no longer have that opportunity. Unfortunately for Georgia, this looks to have achieved Russian goals.

We hope this unveiling has helped to convey the truth.